In markets for experience goods, publications exist to help consumers decide which products to purchase. However, in most cases these publications accept advertising from the very firms whose products they review, raising the possibility that they bias product reviews to favor advertisers. To test for biased product reviews, I exploit the fact that, of the two major U.S. wine publications, only Wine Spectator accepts advertising. Although the average Wine Spectator ratings earned by advertisers and non-advertisers are similar, I find that advertisers earn just less than one point higher Wine Spectator ratings than non-advertisers when I use Wine Advocate ratings to adjust for differences in quality. However, I find only weak evidence that the selective retasting of advertisers' wines contributes to the higher ratings. Moreover, conditional on published ratings, Wine Spectator is no more likely to bestow awards upon advertisers. I conclude that while advertising may influence ratings on the margin, Wine Spectator appears largely to insulate reviewers from the influence of advertisers. (JEL Classification: L15, M37)
I. Introduction
In markets for experience goods, publications exist to inform consumers' decisions about which goods to purchase. 1 These publications introduce consumers to the available products and publish product reviews intended to help consumers rank them. However, with notable exceptions like Consumer Reports, these publications receive a substantial portion of their revenue from advertisers. This raises the possibility that publications bias their contents to favor advertisers. Specifically, publications that accept advertising might review disproportionately more products from firms that advertise (biased product coverage), or they might review products from advertisers more favorably than comparable products from non-advertisers (biased product reviews). Both forms of bias are likely to benefit advertisers through increased demand. 2 However, whether it is optimal for a publication to bias its content depends on how the introduction of bias would impact the number of consumers who rely upon that publication.
Consider the profit maximization problem for a publication that derives revenue from both advertisers and subscribers. 3 Advertising revenues are increasing in the number of subscribers and the extent to which the publication biases its content to favor advertisers (for a fixed number of subscribers). 4 Subscription revenues are increasing in the number of subscribers and the price of a subscription. Finally, the number of subscribers is decreasing in the price of a subscription and increasing in the publication's reputation for being unbiased. This simple model yields three insights. First, the more costly that it is for consumers to rely upon a biased publication, the less likely the publication is to permit bias. In this case, the increase in advertising revenues associated with bias is likely to be outweighed by the decrease in advertising and subscription revenues associated with fewer subscribers. Second, because demand is increasing in a publication's reputation for being unbiased (at a fixed subscription rate), it is optimal for publications to take actions that prevent-or appear to prevent-advertiser status from influencing content. Third, consumers may be willing to accept bias if the higher advertising revenues that arise from bias are used to lower subscription rates. This last point provides two ways to interpret the continued existence of publications that both accept advertising and review advertisers' products. Either these publications are unbiased or consumers would rather pay the lower subscription rates that advertising bias makes possible than fund the publications entirely through higher subscription rates. It is, therefore, an empirical question whether any particular publication biases its content.
In this paper, I use data collected from two major U.S. wine publications to test for biased product reviews. 5 There are several reasons why wine publications are a nice environment in which to test for potential pro-advertiser biases. First, because each vintage of each wine is a different good, the typical issue of a wine publication contains several hundred reviews, which translates into a correspondingly large number of observations when conducting statistical tests. Second, each of the major U.S. wine publications rates wine quality on a scale that ranges from 50 to 100. The fact that each of these publications distills quality to a single number allows for easy comparisons of wine ratings across publications. Third, none of the major U.S. wine publications specializes in wines from a particular region or set of regions, thereby ruling out any obvious differences in taste. Fourth, while consumers presumably have a preference for unbiased wine reviews, biased wine reviews impose low enough costs on consumers that biased product reviews of wine are more likely than, for example, biased product reviews of consumer durables. Fifth, of the two most influential U.S. wine publications, only one accepts advertising. Wine Spectator is funded by a mixture of advertising revenue and subscriptions, while Wine Advocate, "the independent consumer's bimonthly guide to fine wine," is funded entirely by subscriptions. The fact that Wine Advocate uses the lack of advertising as a selling point suggests that some consumers expect advertising to bias wine reviews in other publications. 6 The claim that a publication biases its product reviews is the claim that advertisers receive more favorable reviews on their products than they would have received if they were not advertisers. Because I do not observe the counter-factual reviews, I use reviews from Wine Advocate to proxy for the true quality of the wines reviewed by Wine Spectator. Controlling for (censored) Wine Advocate ratings, I find a positive (partial) correlation between Wine Spectator ratings and measures of lagged advertising intensity. The implication is that Wine Spectator ratings of advertisers' wines are approximately one point higher than their ratings of comparable wines from non-advertisers. (The fact that Wine Advocate essentially only publishes ratings of 85 and above complicates the tests for biased wine ratings. In Section 3, I describe how to overcome these complications.) To the extent that consumer demand rises with the Wine Spectator rating, (slightly) higher ratings should translate into (slightly) higher prices.
Although my finding that advertisers receive higher Wine Spectator ratings is consistent with biased wine ratings, it is also consistent with the two publications evaluating wine using different standards, perhaps because they cater to different consumer tastes. Specifically, if Wine Spectator systematically favors some types of wines, Wine Advocate systematically favors other types of wines, and expected differences in Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate ratings drive decisions about how much to advertise in Wine Spectator, the estimated (partial) correlation between Wine Spectator ratings and advertising intensity could be positive even in the absence of biased wine ratings. In other words, the higher Wine Spectator ratings of advertisers could reflect the fact that wineries who make "Wine Spectator style" wines advertise in Wine Spectator because their wines are the most likely to appeal to Wine Spectator readers. 7 Fortunately, there are several reasons to doubt that expected differences between Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate ratings drive advertising in Wine Spectator. First, wineries that advertise tend to be the large-production wineries, and while Wine Spectator may have a preference for reviewing large-production wines, it is not clear that large wineries should be more likely to produce wines whose qualities appeal to Wine Spectator's reviewers. Second, both publications maintain that their ratings have objective merit. According to a statement on the cover of each issue of Wine Advocate, "While some have suggested that scoring is not well suited to a beverage that has been romantically extolled for centuries, wine is no different from any consumer product. There are specific standards of quality that full-time wine professionals recognize, and there are benchmark wines against which all others can be judged." Table 1 provides a key for interpreting Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate ratings. Nevertheless, because identification is crucial, I use data on which advertisements cite Wine Spectator ratings to test whether advertising by "Wine Spectator style" wineries introduces a positive bias into estimates of biased wine ratings. Interestingly, I find a negative (partial) correlation between the fraction of a winery's advertisements that cite prior Wine Spectator ratings (or awards) and the ratings that Wine Spectator bestows upon its wines. Above, I stated that the need for credibility with consumers might prompt publications to take steps to separate advertisers from reviewers. In the case of Wine Spectator, this is accomplished through the use of blind tastings, in which "tasters are told only the general type of wine (varietal or region) and the vintage." According to a statement that appears in each issue of Wine Spectator, "Notes and ratings are entered directly into our database prior to the removal of the bags. Additional comments may be added to a note after the identity of the wine is revealed, but the score is never changed." Blind tastings speak to the value Wine Spectator places on maintaining a reputation for unbiased reviews, and would appear to rule out biased wine ratings. However, biased wine ratings could still arise through selective retasting. According to Wine Spectator, "We retaste all wines that score 70 points or less. We retaste many other wines to confirm impressions. Outstanding scores are routinely confirmed by another editor." Therefore, if Wine Spectator were more likely to retaste wines from wineries that advertise-perhaps because it is easier to obtain additional bottles from advertisers-and if published ratings reflect the quality of the best bottle tasted, these facts will collectively bias wine ratings in favor of advertisers. Because reviews indicate when published ratings are based on multiple tastings of the same wine, I am able to test whether biased wine ratings arise through selective retasting. While I find evidence that Wine Spectator is more likely to retaste an advertiser's wine, within the full sample of U.S. wines reviewed by Wine Spectator, retastings are associated with lower Wine Spectator ratings for advertisers and non-advertisers alike. Moreover, when I control for retastings within this sample, I continue to find that advertisers earn higher ratings than non-advertisers. However, I also find that Wine Spectator is more likely to retaste wines rated by Wine Advocate. Within this smaller sample of wines, I find that retastings differentially increase the ratings of advertisers. However, the number of retasted wines is much too small to explain a one-point difference in ratings.
Finally, I use the fact that Wine Spectator bestows awards upon a small fraction of reviewed wines to test for biased awards. The four awards are Best Buy, Cellar Selection, Highly Recommended, and Spectator Selection, which is the publication's highest award. Although the awards are targeted at different types of wines, relative to ratings, Wine Spectator should have considerably more discretion in deciding which wines receive awards. Consequently, if Wine Spectator biases its content to favor advertisers, one might expect more bias along the awards dimension than along the ratings dimension. As expected, I find that the probability of receiving an award is increasing in Wine Spectator's published rating. Therefore, everything else equal, biased ratings should increase the probability of receiving an award. However, conditional on price, production level, and rating, I find that advertisers are either no more likely or less likely to receive awards than non-advertisers.
Differences in the subscription rates, circulations, and contents of the two publications prevent me from testing for biased wine coverage, because these differences suggest that it is optimal for Wine Spectator to review fewer small-production wines than does Wine Advocate. 8 Since the wineries that advertise are more likely to sell large-production wines, it then becomes impossible to identify whether wines are reviewed in Wine Spectator because they are widely-available and, hence, of interest to its readers or because they come from wineries that advertise. 9 However, the fact that only 9.8% of the wines reviewed by Wine Spectator come from wineries that advertise, certainly suggests that Wine Spectator is willing to review wines from wineries that do not advertise.
Overall, the tests for biased ratings and biased awards produce little consistent evidence that Wine Spectator favors advertisers. At worst, the tests for biased ratings suggest that Wine Spectator rates wines from advertisers almost one point higher than wines from nonadvertisers. However, selective retastings can explain at most half of this bias and only within the set of U.S. wines rated by both Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate. Given Wine Spectator's claim that it rates wines blind, the remaining difference in ratings may simply reflect consistent differences in how the two publications rate quality. The fact that tests for biased awards provide no evidence of bias suggests that there is little bias overall. Therefore, despite the fact that Wine Spectator is dependent on advertising revenue, the long-run value of producing credible reviews appears to limit bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used to test for biased ratings and biased awards and summarizes how wines produced by advertisers differ from those produced by non-advertisers. Section 3 formulates tests for biased ratings and discusses a number of econometric complications. Section 4 presents the empirical results of each test, and Section 5 concludes.
II. Overview of the Data
In this paper, I test for biased wine reviews using a unique database that combines wine review and advertising data from three sources. First, wine reviews published in Wine Spectator during 1999 and 2000 were obtained from Wine Spectator Online. From these reviews, I extracted the name and vintage of each wine, the name of the winery that produced it, the grape varietal(s) from which it was produced, the region(s) and country in which the grapes were grown, the production level (measured in cases), the U.S. retail price, the Wine Spectator rating, the Wine Spectator award (if any), and whether the published rating was 8 During my sample period, Wine Advocate charged $55 per year for six issues containing little more than ratings and tasting notes, whereas Wine Spectator charged $45 per year for eighteen issues containing wine reviews, restaurant reviews, travel guides, recipes, and glossy color photographs. Moreover, the audited circulation of Wine Spectator was close to 325,000 (with an estimated 1.5 million readers) while the audited circulation of Wine Advocate was closer to 40,000. According to Wine Spectator, "Wines are chosen for tasting among those sent to our offices for review and those purchased at retail. Because we for the most part serve a U.S. audience, we prefer to review wines that are widely-available there and merit wide interest for that readership." 9 More generally, to claim that a publication biases its product coverage is to claim that among the set of products that interest its readership the publication reviews a disproportionate number of products from advertisers. Therefore, testing for biased product coverage requires that one be able to identify which products not reviewed by a publication are of interest to its readers. the result of multiple tastings. Using wine name, winery name, and vintage variables, I also attempted to determine the Wine Spectator rating awarded to the prior vintage of each wine reviewed in 2000. Wines tasted from barrel and wines tasted as part of special tastings (such as a vertical tasting of the wines from a particular winery) were dropped from the sample, reducing the total number of reviews in 2000 from 11,371 to 10,935. 10 Second, from each of the Wine Spectator issues published during 1999 and 2000, I collected data on which wineries advertised in Wine Spectator, the page size of each winery's advertisement, and whether the advertisement cited a Wine Spectator rating or award. 11 The advertising data from 1999 were used to calculate the number of pages of advertising placed by each winery through the end of 1999, as well as the number of pages of advertising that cited a Wine Spectator rating or award. For each wine reviewed in 2000, I classified the wine as coming from an advertiser if the winery advertised at least once in the prior 12 months. 2000 ; this is the sample of wines used to test for biased wine ratings. Panel B focuses on the full set of wines reviewed by Wine Spectator in 2000; this larger sample of wines is used to test for biased awards. "WS rating" and "WA rating" correspond to published Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate ratings, excluding barrel samples and wines reviewed as part of special tastings. "WS prior rating" is the Wine Spectator rating for the prior vintage of a particular wine. The fact that the number of "WS prior ratings" is less than half the number of "WS ratings" reflects the facts that Wine Spectator does not review the same set of wines every year and that Wine Spectator does not always record wine names consistently from one vintage to the next. "WA tasted" equals one if Wine Advocate published a review (though not necessarily a rating) for the wine and "WA recommends" equals one if Wine Advocate rated the wine 85 points or above. "Price" is the retail price as reported in Wine Spectator at the time of the review. "Production" is the production level of the wine, measured in cases. It is available for approximately 97.5 percent of U.S. wines and for approximately 75 percent of all wines. "Ad Pages" measures the number of pages of advertising taken out by each winery in the 18 issues published over the prior 12 months, while "Ad Pages WS" measures the number of these pages that cite a Wine Spectator Table 3 because eight wines are simply rated "?".
rating or award. Measured in this way, less than one in five pages of advertising cites Wine Spectator. "Ad Dummy" equals one if the winery advertised in Wine Spectator in the prior 18 issues (i.e., if "Ad Pages" is positive), and "Ad Dummy WS" equals one if any of a winery's advertisements cited Wine Spectator. "Ad Ratio" is the ratio of a winery's advertisements that cite Wine Spectator to those that do not (and equals zero when "Ad Pages" equals zero). Finally, the "Retasted Dummy" equals one if the published Wine Spectator rating was based on multiple tastings of the wine. 12 Selective retasting provides a mechanism through which biased wine ratings might arise, although the extent of possible bias is limited by the fact that only 4.4 percent of wines are reported as having been retasted. 13 The lack of Wine Advocate below 85 points is apparent, as is the relatively low correlation (0.493) between the ratings published in the two publications. To the extent that the publications measure quality using the same standards, this low correlation suggests that one or both ratings contain a substantial amount of noise. Table 3 compares the ratings and characteristics of various subsets of wines. Panel A focuses on U.S. wines and indicates that 18.7 percent of U.S. wines come from wineries that advertised in Wine Spectator prior to being reviewed. Moreover, it indicates that wines produced by advertisers have slightly higher Wine Spectator ratings (86.14 versus 85.84), slightly lower prices ($26.76 versus $28.72) , and are made in much larger quantities (29,853 cases versus 3,768 cases) than wines produced by non-advertisers. The higher ratings (for a given price and production level) are consistent with biased wine ratings but are also consistent with more advertising by higher-quality wineries. Comparing wine for which Wine Advocate ratings are available to those for which they are not, reveals that wines reviewed by Wine Advocate are more expensive and produced in smaller quantities than the average wine reviewed by Wine Spectator. 14 The higher average Wine Spectator rating for wines with Wine Advocate ratings reflects the fact that Wine Advocate rarely publishes ratings of 14 I did not collect data on the set of wines reviewed by Wine Advocate but not reviewed by Wine Spectator. Therefore, if Wine Advocate tends to review smaller-production wines than does Wine Spectator, the differences in panel A understate the true differences between the two publications. less than 85 points and that the ratings in the two publications are positively correlated. The average differences in the Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate ratings of advertisers and nonadvertisers suggest a difference-in-difference estimated advertising bias of 0.42 points (within the nonrandom sample of wines reviewed by both publications).
Panel B focuses on the full set of wines reviewed by Wine Spectator in 2000. The comparison of wines produced by advertisers and non-advertisers is qualitatively similar to the comparison in Panel A. Wine Spectator awards, collectively bestowed upon approximately 3.2 percent of the wines reviewed each year, are of four types: Best Buys are "wines of value [with] solid scores, modest prices, wide distribution"; Cellar Selections are "wines we believe will improve most from additional bottle age and show the greatest potential as collectibles"; Highly Recommended wines are "noteworthy wines selected from among the highest-scoring wines in the issue"; and Spectator Selections are "[Wine Spectator's] highest recommendations in each issue.... they are the wines we think would make the best purchases based on a combination of rating, price, and availability." Average ratings, prices, and production levels differ across the four Wine Spectator awards in ways consistent with the stated criteria. Although I do not test for biased product coverage, the fact that only 9.8 percent of wines come from wineries that advertise suggests that wineries need not advertise in order to have their products reviewed. The fact that 18.7 of U.S. wines come from advertisers, indicates that foreign wineries are less likely to advertise in Wine Spectator than domestic wines (although this aggregate percentage masks substantial cross country differences).
Finally, Panel C compares wineries that advertise at any point in 2000 to non-advertisers. For each winery, I calculated production-weighted average Wine Spectator ratings and prices, total production, and the percentage of wines reviewed in 2000 when classified as an advertiser (i.e., for which "Ad Dummy" equals one). I then averaged the winery-level statistics across the two sets of wineries. Of the 811 U.S. wineries whose wines were reviewed by Wine Spectator, only 76 advertised in Wine Spectator in 2000. Moreover, the estimated average production level of these 76 advertisers is approximately 18 times greater than the average production level of non-advertisers. The difference in production levels is smaller, but still substantial, when including foreign wineries. Also, for both sets of wineries, the production-weighted average Wine Spectator ratings of advertisers are less than those of non-advertisers. Comparing the number of wines reviewed by Wine Spectator to the number of wineries, indicates that each year Wine Spectator reviews, on average, approximately three wines per winery.
III. Empirical Framework

A. Uni-Dimensional Quality
Let subscript i represent a particular wine produced by winery j from grapes grown in region k during vintage l. For example, when wine i is the 1995 Beringer Private Reserve Napa Valley Cabernet Sauvignon, j, k, and l are Beringer, Napa Valley, and 1995, respectively. Assume that quality can be measured along a single dimension and let Q i * denote the quality of wine i. Because Q i * is unobservable, wine ratings are intended to provide consumers with estimates of Q i * . Let WS it be the rating awarded to wine i by Wine Spectator on date t and AD jt be a stock measure of winery j's advertising in Wine Spectator through (but not including) date t. Assume that Wine Spectator observes Q i * with noise and that WS it is linear and strictly increasing in this (noisy) measure of quality. 15 Formally,
where ε it is a random variable with zero mean (so that Q i i t * +  ε is an unbiased estimate of Q i * ) and WS it is a function of the advertising measure AD jt . Under the null hypothesis of unbiased ratings, β equals zero, whereas under the alternative hypothesis of (positively) biased ratings, β is positive.
If Q * were observed by the econometrician, it would be straightforward to test whether the coefficient on AD were significantly different from zero. That Q * is unobserved introduces econometric difficulties. Specifically, unless Q * and AD are uncorrelated, a regression of WS on AD alone suffers from an omitted-variables bias. In such a regression, the coefficient on AD will be biased upward if wineries that produce higher quality wines are more likely to advertise in Wine Spectator (i.e., quality and advertising are strategic complements), and it will be biased downward if wineries that produce lower quality wines are more likely to advertise in Wine Spectator (i.e., quality and advertising are strategic substitutes).
There are two ways to control for unobserved quality. First, I can model Q * as a function of observable characteristics and use those characteristics as additional explanatory variables in a regression of WS on AD. For this approach to remove the omitted-variables bias, it must control for the variation in Q * that is correlated with AD. Consider a model which decomposes quality into three components:
where θ i depends on actions taken by the winery and winemaker during vintage k and includes a shock specific to wine i, η j is a winery fixed effect, and η kl is a region-by-vintage fixed effect.
The region and vintage fixed effect acknowledges that fluctuations in quality across vintages and regions are driven by shared fluctuations in the weather. Since high quality grapes are a necessary input into the production of high quality wine, weather patterns during the vintage are an important determinant of final quality. 16 Moreover, because my tests focus on releases of U.S. wines within a single year, the number of region-by-vintage fixed effects is relatively small, allowing me to control for this source of variation in Q * . The winery fixed effect acknowledges that some wineries consistently possess better vineyards (within region l ) and employ better winemakers than do other wineries. However, because my sample consists of wines reviewed in a single year and because a large number of wineries only have one or two wines reviewed each year, I cannot control for variation in η j . 17 It is also not possible to control directly for θ i although I can include production level and price of wine i as proxies. The expected relationship between θ i and production level is negative because growing fewer grapes per acre produces higher quality grapes. 18 To the extent that higher prices reflect production costs associated with producing higher quality wine, the expected relationship between θ i and price is positive.
The second way I can control for unobserved quality is to use the published rating for wine i from Wine Advocate as a proxy for Q i * . Since the Wine Advocate rating is based on a tasting of wine i, it is likely to capture variation in quality across regions and vintages (η kl ) as well as how wine i compares to wines from the same region and vintage (θ i + η j ). And because Wine Advocate does not accept advertising, Wine Advocate ratings should be unbiased estimates of Q i * . For these reasons, Wine Advocate ratings may be better proxies for Q i * than a model based on fixed effects and observable characteristics.
However, a complication arises from the fact that I only observe Wine Advocate ratings for a subset of the wines for which I observe Wine Spectator ratings. Let WA it * be the rating assigned to wine i by Wine Advocate on date t. 19 Assume that
16 Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde (1995) 
That I do not know whether WA it is missing because wine i was not ]tasted or because wine i was tasted and received a rating less than 85, differentiates equation (4) from a standard censored regression problem. Instead, one can think of equation (4) as arising from a model in which Wine Advocate tastes every wine that Wine Spectator tastes but applies different censoring criteria to different wines. Some wines are coded as missing when WA it * is less than 85, other wines are coded as missing for all values of WA it * , and I lack data on which censoring point applies to any particular wine. As noted in Amemiya (1985, p. 363) , models in which censoring points vary unobservably across observations typically cannot be estimated. To conduct tests of biased wine ratings several additional assumptions are required. 
where WS it and v it are correlated because both terms contain ε it . Plugging equation (5) β -and γ -have been estimated, the structural parameter β can be estimated as the negative of the ratio of β -to γ -(and its standard error can be estimated using the delta method).
Second, because WS it is correlated with ε it , equation (6) suffers from endogeneity. To eliminate the associated bias, I predict WS it using instrumental variables which are correlated with Q i * but likely to be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic tasting shock ε it . Candidates for instruments include price and production. I then replace the actual Wine Spectator rating in equation (6) with the predicted Wine Spectator rating. 21 Finally, to overcome the problem of unobserved censoring points, I assume that wine i is tasted by Wine Advocate with fixed probability p i . In other words, I assume that a known fraction of the observations are missing at random and the remainder are missing because WA it * is less than 85. 22 To estimate equation (6) (6) is given by
where σ is the standard deviation of v it , φ and Φ correspond to the pdf and cdf of a standard normal random variable, and The likelihood function in equation (7) differs from the standard Tobit likelihood function in that it contains p, the probability that Wine Advocate tasted wine i. The log likelihood function is given by
21 Nelson and Olson (1978) argue that replacing endogenous regressors with predicted values and maximizing a standard Tobit likelihood function yields consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the Tobit coefficients. However, the standard errors implied by the information matrix understate the true standard errors because they ignore the prediction error. Moreover, Newey (1987) demonstrates that this technique does not generally yield efficient estimates. While the efficient estimator proposed in Newey (1987) cannot readily be extended to the modified likelihood function that I estimate, to adjust for prediction error, I bootstrap my standard errors. 22 Alternatively, I could assume a relationship between observable characteristics and the probability that wine i is tasted. However, I lack the data needed to estimate such a model.
where the summation involving ln p in equation (8) 
B. Multi-Dimensional Quality
The discussion above assumes that quality can be measured along a single dimension. Under this assumption, WA it is a good proxy for Q i * and I can interpret a positive coefficient on AD as evidence of biased wine ratings. Interpreting the coefficient on AD becomes more difficult, however, if quality is multi-dimensional, the two publications favor different dimensions, and these differences are correlated with wineries decisions about whether and how much to advertise.
ws be the quality of wine i as perceived by Wine Spectator and let Q i wa be the quality of wine i as perceived by Wine Advocate. Equation (1) 
Using WA it to proxy for unobserved quality does not control for unobserved differences between Q i ws and Q i wa . If these differences are correlated with wineries' decisions about how much to advertise in Wine Spectator, regressions of WS on AD and WA suffer from the sort of omitted-variables bias discussed above. For example, if wineries that expect relatively higher Wine Spectator ratings are more likely to advertise in Wine Spectator, the estimated coefficient on AD will be positive even if ratings are unbiased and the true coefficient on AD is zero.
Empirically, there are two ways to address this type of omitted-variables bias. First, I can use measures of advertising intensity that are less sensitive to a potential correlation between AD jt and the difference between Q i ws and Q i wa . For example, rather than measure AD jt as the number of pages of advertising taken out by winery j through (but not including) time t, I could measure AD jt as a dummy variable that equals one if and only if winery j has previous advertised in Wine Spectator. Because Wine Advocate does not accept advertising and Wine Spectator has the largest circulation of any U.S. wine publications, U.S. wineries that do not produce "Wine Advocate style" wines may still advertise in Wine Spectator, just less often. Second, I can attempt to classify wineries as making either "Wine Spectator style" wines or "Wine Advocate style" wines and ask whether the impact of AD on ratings is differentially higher for the "Wine Spectator style" wineries. Data on which wineries cite Wine Spectator ratings and awards in their advertisements provide me with an (imperfect) way to identify "Wine Spectator style" wineries.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Testing for Biased Ratings
In this section, I test whether Wine Spectator biases its ratings to favor advertisers. Each test for biased ratings is run using two measures of advertising. The first measure is a dummy variable that equals one if the wine comes from a winery that advertised in Wine Spectator in the 12 months prior to the issue published on date t. It allows me to ask whether advertisers are treated differently on average than non-advertisers. The second measure is a function of the number of pages of advertising that winery placed in Wine Spectator in the 12 months prior to time t. (The function is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of pages of advertising, which ranges from 0 to approximately 2.5.) It allows me to ask whether bias is increasing in the amount that wineries advertise.
These measures differ in two ways from the measures that Wine Spectator would likely use to determine advertising status. First, my advertising dummy classifies a winery as an advertisers in the issue after its first advertisement, but does not stop classifying the winery as an advertiser until 12 months after its last advertisement. Therefore, it is possible that only a subset of the wineries which I classify as advertisers are actively advertising in Wine Spectator. Second, while Wine Spectator would presumably rank wineries based on expected advertising revenue, I focus on pages of advertising placed in Wine Spectator prior to the review of each wine. This measure ignores the facts that some pages of the magazine are more expensive to advertise in than others and that Wine Spectator derives additional advertising revenue from Wine Spectator Online. Also, if a winery undertakes a large advertising campaign, Wine Spectator might immediately classify the winery as a large advertiser whereas my page measure will initially classify it as a relatively small advertiser. However, adjusting the advertising measures to include future advertising will bias the tests towards finding evidence of biased wine ratings if wineries that receive favorable reviews at time t choose to advertise those reviews at time t +1. Moreover, winery advertising is highly persistent in my sample. Wineries that advertise in 1999 are quite likely to advertise throughout 2000, and there are only a few wineries that advertised in 2000 and did not advertise in 1999. Overall, I expect that my advertising measures are reasonable proxies for which wineries advertise and how much they advertise. Table 4 contains my initial tests for biased wine ratings. These tests use the wine ratings and advertising data collected from Wine Spectator, but ignore wine ratings from Wine Advocate. Within this sample, I find little evidence that advertising is correlated with ratings. In columns (1) and (4), I present univariate regressions of Wine Spectator ratings on each of the advertising measures. (All of the standard errors in Table 4 are clustered on winery.) While both estimated coefficients are positive, only the coefficient on advertising pages is statistically significant from zero (and only at the 10-percent level). In addition, the implied impact of advertising on ratings is modest. For example, an increase from 0 to 1.286 (the average (natural log) page measure for wineries that advertise) is predicted to increase the Wine Spectator rating by 0.406 points. (4) through (6) Of course, to the extent that winery decisions about how much to advertise in Wine Spectator depend on the quality of their wines, the univariate regressions suffer from omitted-variables bias. In an attempt to control for the unobserved quality of each wine, columns (2) and (4) include the natural logarithm of production, varietal fixed effects, and region-by-vintage fixed effects as additional regressors. Interestingly, while the estimated coefficients on these controls are statistically significant, the estimated coefficients on the advertising measures are essentially unchanged. However, when I add the natural logarithm of price as an additional control for quality, I find no evidence that advertising is positively correlated with Wine Spectator ratings.
To better control for quality, Table 5 presents tests for biased wine ratings based upon the modified Tobit framework derived above. This framework uses Wine Advocate ratings to control for the unobserved quality of each wine reviewed by Wine Spectator. However, because Wine Advocate ratings are censored, I treat them as the dependent variable and treat Wine Spectator ratings and the advertising measures as independent variables. The tests for biased wine ratings can then be recast as a joint test that the coefficient on Wine Spectator ratings is positive and the coefficient on the advertising measure is negative (so that Wine Advocate ratings are consistently lower than Wine Spectator ratings for wines from advertisers). Alternatively, the coefficients obtained by maximizing the modified Tobit likelihood function can be used to recover direct estimates of how each advertising The top panel reports coefficients from the Modified Tobit described in Section 3, estimated using the full sample of U.S. wines reviewed by Wine Spectator in 2000. The dependent variable equals the Wine Advocate rating when the rating is observed and greater than or equal to 85, and it equals zero otherwise. Independent variables include a lagged advertising measure and Wine Spectator ratings. Natural logarithm of production and price used as instruments when predicting Wine Spectator rating. Columns (1) through (3) measure advertising with a dummy variable that equals one if the winery advertised at least once in the prior 12 months.
Columns (4) through (6) measure advertising as (the natural log of one plus) the number of pages of advertising taken out by the winery in the prior 12 months. Because six of the specifications involve predicted regressors, standard errors in the top panel are estimated via bootstrapping (with 1000 replications). The bottom panel reports the direct effect of each independent variable on Wine Spectator ratings. For example, the direct effect of advertising measure on Wine Spectator rating estimated as the negative of the the coefficienton lagged advertising measure divided by the coefficient on Wine Spectator rating; the magnitude is directly comparable to estimates in Table 4 . Standard errors for the direct effects are estimated via the delta method. Coefficients (and fixed effects) significantly different from zero (in two-sided tests) at the 10-percent level are marked with *, 5-percent level are marked with **, and 1-percent level are marked with ***.
measure influences Wine Spectator ratings. 23 The top panel of Table 5 reports maximum likelihood estimates based on the modified Tobit maximum likelihood function. Because several of the specifications include predicted ratings, standard errors are estimated via bootstrapping (based on 1000 replications). The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the direct effect of each independent variable on the Wine Spectator rating, with standard errors calculated using the delta method.
The coefficients estimated via maximum likelihood are functions of the probability that Wine Advocate tasted wines for which it did not publish reviews. Approximately 40 percent of the Wine Spectator ratings of U.S. wines are below 85 points. Assuming this holds true in the distribution of Wine Advocate ratings as well, the 680 Wine Advocate ratings at and above 85 points imply approximately 1,133 total reviews. As a ratio to the total number of wines reviewed by Wine Spectator, this implies that the probability of Wine Advocate having tasted any particular bottle of wine is approximately 0.41. Therefore, I set p equal to 0.41. 24 The results in columns (1) and (5) are based on specifications that include actual Wine Spectator ratings with each lagged advertising measure. The estimated Tobit coefficients on actual Wine Spectator ratings are both 0.620, but the estimate in column (5) is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In addition, the estimated Tobit coefficients on both advertising measures (and the implied direct effects of those measures on Wine Spectator ratings) are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In other words, these specifications yield no evidence of bias. However, because actual Wine Spectator ratings are assumed to be noisy measures of true quality, these initial specifications suffer from errors-in-variables.
The remaining six columns of Table 5 replace actual Wine Spectator ratings with predicted Wine Spectator ratings, where the natural logarithm of production and price are used as instruments in first stage regressions. In each case, the estimated Tobit coefficient on Wine Spectator ratings goes from 0.620 to slightly above one. 25 Correcting for the measurement error in Wine Spectator ratings, the estimated coefficients in columns (2) and (6) are consistent with Wine Spectator bestowing slightly higher ratings on advertisers. The estimated Tobit coefficients in column (2) imply that wines from advertisers receive 0.964 more points from Wine Spectator than comparable wines from non-advertisers (significant at the 5-percent level). The results in column (6) imply that the level of bias is increasing in the level of prior advertising, with the average advertiser receiving 0.847 more points (0.659 times 1.286) than a non-advertiser.
Under the identifying assumption that Wine Advocate and Wine Spectator rate wines using the same standards, the results in columns (2) and (6) constitute evidence of biased wine ratings. Columns (3) and (7) attempt to test this identifying assumption. Lagged advertising ratio is the ratio of the number of pages citing Wine Spectator ratings and awards to the total number of pages of advertising placed by each winery. If some wineries produce "Wine Spectator style" wines and these wineries are more likely to cite Wine Spectator in their advertisements, lagged advertising ratio should be highest for the "Wine Spectator style" wineries and the Tobit coefficients on lagged advertising ratio should be negative. 26 Instead, the estimated Tobit coefficients on lagged advertising ratio are positive and the estimated Tobit coefficients on the other lagged advertising measures are more negative than in columns (2) and (6). For example, according to the estimates in the bottom panel of column (2), wines from advertisers for which lagged advertising ratio equals zero receive 1.536 more points than comparable wines from non-advertisers while advertisers for which lagged advertising ratio equals one receive − 0.540 less points (1.536 plus −2.076) than comparable wines from nonadvertisers (although this difference is not statistically different from zero). Another way to ask whether the biased ratings results are being driven by "Wine Spectator style" wineries is to compare the estimates using the advertising dummy to the estimates using pages of advertising. If "Wine Spectator style" wineries advertise more often than other wineries, this might explain why the amount of bias is increasing in pages of advertising. However, the bias implied by both advertising measures is quite similar for the average advertiser.
B. Testing Whether Biased Ratings Arise from Selective Retasting
Although Wine Spectator's use of blind tastings would appear to rule out biased ratings, biased ratings potentially could arise through selective retasting. Specifically, if Wine Spectator were more likely to retaste wines from wineries that advertise, and if published scores tend to represent the best of several bottles tasted, these facts would bias Wine Spectator's published wine ratings in favor of advertisers. Let Retaste it be a dummy variable that equals one if Wine Spectator reports tasting wine i more than once before publishing its rating at time t, and zero otherwise. To test whether the observed bias in wine ratings can be explained by selective retastings on the part of Wine Spectator, in columns (4) and (8), I include Retaste it and Retaste it interacted with AD jt as additional explanatory variables. Within the full sample of U.S. wines, I find little evidence that selective retasting can explain the higher ratings earned by Wine Spectator's advertisers. First, I continue to find evidence that advertisers receive an additional point from Wine Spectator. Second, the coefficients on the interaction terms provide no support for the hypothesis that retastings benefit advertisers differentially more than non-advertisers.
In a final attempt to determine the mechanism through which the positive (partial) correlation between advertising measures and Wine Spectator ratings might arise, Table 6 restricts tests for selective retasting to the nonrandom sample of U.S. wines for which I observe ratings from both publications. If Wine Advocate ratings prompt Wine Spectator to retaste wines-perhaps because Wine Spectator is reluctant to publish lower ratings for advertisers than their wines earned in Wine Advocate-this is precisely the sample of wines in which selective retastings might bias ratings. As motivation for restricting attention to this sample, coefficients estimated via probit in columns (1) and (2) demonstrate that Wine Spectator is significantly more likely to retaste wines that have been reviewed by Wine Advocate. (The marginal effect is estimated to be 3 percentage points, which is quite large given that only 4.4 percent of wines are retasted.) These probit specifications also provide some evidence that Wine Spectator is more likely to retaste advertisers' wines. The marginal effects range from 1.250 percentage points (p-value of 0.084) to 1.858 percentage points (p-value of 0.131). Columns (1) and (3) measure advertising with a dummy variable that equals one if the winery advertised at least once in the prior 12 months. Columns (2) and (4) measure advertising as (the natural log of one plus) the number of pages of advertising taken out by the winery in the prior 12 months. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the probability that wine i is retasted by Wine Spectator as a function of a dummy variable that indicates whether Wine Advocate published a review for the wine and a lagged advertising measure. The probit specifications are estimated on the full set of U.S. wines reviewed by Wine Spectator. Marginal effects (multiplied by 100) are reported. Columns (3) and (4) regress the difference between the published Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate ratings on a lagged advertising measure, a dummy that indicates whether the wine was retasted by Wine Spectator, and the retasted dummy interacted with the lagged advertising measure. As such, columns (3) and (4) are restricted to the set of U.S. wines for which Wine Advocate published a rating. All standard errors are clustered on winery. Coefficients significantly different than zero at the 10-percent level are marked with *, 5-percent level are marked with **, and 1-percent level are marked with ***.
Columns (3) and (4) then regress differences between Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate ratings on a lagged advertising measure, a retasted dummy, and the retasted dummy interacted with the lagged advertising measure. In these specifications, the estimated coefficients on the lagged advertising measures are much lower than those implied by Table 5 and are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The negative coefficients on the retasted dummy indicate that wines which are retasted by Wine Spectator are rated, on average, between 1.95 and 2.70 points lower in Wine Spectator than in Wine Advocate. In column (3), the estimated coefficient on the retasted dummy interacted with the lagged advertising dummy is 2.406 (p-value of 0.104), suggesting that the lower ratings associated with retasting are limited to wines from non-advertisers. In other words, within this nonrandom sample, column (3) suggests that advertisers benefit more from retastings than do non-advertisers. Multiplying the 2.406 point bias by the 31 advertiser wines that were retasted by Wine Spectator and dividing by the 135 wines produced by advertisers (within this sample of 705 wines) yields an average pro-advertiser bias of 0.55 points-approximately half the level of bias implied by the estimates in Table 5 . However, the differential retasting result does not hold in column (4), when the advertising dummy is replaced with pages of advertising. Therefore, while the selective retasting of advertisers' wines may contribute to the slightly higher ratings Wine Spectator bestows upon advertisers' wines, selective retasting is incapable of explaining a one point difference within either the full sample of U.S. wines or the subsample of wines for which I observe a Wine Advocate rating.
C. Testing for Biased Awards
The fact that Wine Spectator bestows awards upon a (small) fraction of the wines it reviews raises the possibility that awards are tied to advertising. I test for biased awards using data on the full sample of wines reviewed by Wine Spectator in 2000. In these tests, I ask whether Wine Spectator is more likely to bestow awards upon advertisers, controlling for the published Wine Spectator rating, price, and production level of each wine. Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of the wines that receive each Wine Spectator award. For all four awards, the percentage of awards going to advertisers (ranging from 15.4 percent to 36.8 percent) exceeds the percentage of wines reviewed from non-advertisers (9.8 percent). However, while the different awards are targeted at different types of wines, Wine Spectator has a stated preference for lower prices and higher production levels. Therefore, the higher percentage of awards going to advertisers may be explained by biased awards or by the lower average prices and higher average production levels of advertisers' wines.
Let Award it be a dummy variable that equals one if wine i receives a particular award at date t and zero otherwise. Within the set of wines eligible for each type of award, the likelihood of receiving an award should be increasing in a wine's Wine Spectator rating and its production level, and decreasing in its price. If Wine Spectator is more likely to bestow awards on advertisers, the probability of receiving an award will also be an increasing function of advertising intensity:
27 Assume, for example, that when deciding whether a wine should be designated Best Buy there is an optimal weight (based on the preferences of Wine Spectator's readers) to place on availability. The probit-based tests for biased awards ask whether Wine Spectator favors advertisers conditional on the observed weight Wine Spectator places on availability. In this framework it is not possible to test whether that weight is biased upward to favor the large-production wines produced by advertisers. The tests for biased awards focus on three sets of wine. Columns (1) and (2) test for biased awards using the full set of wines for which price and production are available. The dependent variable equals one if the wine received a Wine Spectator award and equals zero otherwise. Because different wines are eligible for different awards, the remaining columns focus on two subsets of wines. Columns (3) and (4) restrict attention to the set of wines priced $12 or less and produced in quantities of 2,800 cases or more. Within this set of wines, the dependent variable equals one if the wine received a Best Buy or Spectator Selection award and zero otherwise. In contrast, columns (5) and (6) restrict attention to wines rated 88 points or above, because these are the only wines that ever receive the Cellar Selection, Highly Recommended, and (remaining) Spectator Selection awards. Within this set of wines, the dependent variable equals one if the wine received any of these Wine Spectator awards and zero otherwise. Table 8 reports marginal effects (multipled by 100) for each of these specifications. Standard errors are clustered on winery. This table reports marginal effects (multiplied by 100) from probit regressions that predict whether wine i receives an award from Wine Spectator in 2000. "WS Award" equals one if the wine received one of Wine Spectator's four awards and zero otherwise. "Best Buy" is restricted to the set of wines costing $12 or less dollars and production is 2,800 cases or greater. It equals one if the wine received Best Buy or Spectator Selection and zero otherwise. "Other WS Award" is restricted to the set of wines scoring 88 points or above. It equals one if the wine received any of Wine Spectator's awards and zero otherwise. The observed probability of an award corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable; the predicted probability corresponds to the predicted probability of receiving an award, evaluated at the means of the independent variables. Columns (1), (3), and (5) measure advertising with a dummy variable that equals one if the winery advertised at least once in the prior 12 months. Columns (2), (4), and (6) measure advertising as (the natural log of one plus) the number of pages of advertising taken out by the winery in the prior 12 months. Standard errors are clustered on winery. Coefficients significantly different from zero (in two-sided tests) at the 10-percent level are marked with *, 5-percent level are marked with **, and 1-percent level are marked with ***.
Consistent with Wine Spectator's stated criteria, the estimated probability of receiving an award is increasing in both the Wine Spectator rating and the natural logarithm of production and decreasing in the natural logarithm of price. In particular, increasing the Wine Spectator rating by one point is associated with a one percentage point increase in the probability of receiving the Best Buy award (relative to an observed probability of almost 14 percent) and a three percentage point increase in the probability of receiving any other award (relative to an observed probability of almost 13 percent). Therefore, biased ratings could translate into biased awards. However, the estimated coefficients on the advertising measures are negative, and in some cases statistically significant from zero. Therefore, despite the fact that Wine Spectator would appear to have more discretion over awards than ratings, I find no evidence that Wine Spectator allows advertising directly to influence which wines receive awards.
V. Conclusion
With the notable exceptions of publications like Consumer Reports and Wine Advocate, which are funded entirely by subscriptions, the majority of the publications that provide consumers with product reviews accept advertising from the very firms whose products they review. In this paper, I test whether Wine Spectator rewards its advertisers with higher wine ratings or more awards. Put differently, I test whether-within this market-the returns to a reputation for producing unbiased reviews outweigh the returns to bundling favorable reviews with advertising.
Overall, I find little consistent evidence of bias. At worst, the tests for biased ratings suggest that Wine Spectator rates wines from advertisers almost one point higher than wines from non-advertisers. However, selective retastings can explain at most half of this bias and then only within the set of U.S. wines rated by both Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate. Given Wine Spectator's claim that it rates wines blind, the remaining difference in ratings may simply reflect consistent differences in how the two publications rate quality, which leads to predictable differences in advertising. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that tests for biased awards provide no additional evidence of bias. Therefore, despite the fact that Wine Spectator is dependent on advertising revenue, the long-run value of producing credible reviews appears to minimize bias.
The fact that Wine Spectator reviews are largely without bias may have implications for publications in other markets as well. After all, there were several reasons to expect that wine reviews might be biased. First, because the costs of biased wine reviews are low relative to the costs of biased reviews for other types of products, the typical consumers might be relatively tolerate of biased wine reviews. Second, the fact that a subset of consumers are willing to fund Wine Advocate entirely through subscriptions is consistent with these consumers believing that advertising influences the wine reviews published in other publications, and with other consumers not valuing unbiased reviews enough to pay the markedly higher price of Wine Advocate measured on a per review basis. Third, there is a subjective component to rating wine that does not exist, for example, when Morningstar uses mutual fund returns to rank mutual funds. Therefore, when the costs of biased reviews are relatively high or when it would be relatively easy for consumers to determine that a publication has biased its reviews, the results in this paper suggest that reputational considerations may keep publications honest. (Of course, not all product reviews lend themselves to blind comparisons.) Alternatively, the lack of biased wine reviews might reflect the fact that the returns to receiving biased wine ratings are relatively low. For example, the availability of Wine Advocate ratings in wine shops may reduce the weight consumers place on Wine Spectator ratings, thereby lowering a winery's return to a biased Wine Spectator rating. Regardless, this discussion highlights an important limitation of my empirical results. When confronted with large financial returns to biasing their opinions, experts like accounting firms, securities analysts, ratings agencies, and members of the financial media may be little constrained by reputational considerations.
